Firms are usually better informed than tax authorities about market conditions and the potential profits of competitors. They may try to exploit this situation by underreporting their own taxable profits. The tax authority could offset firms' informational advantage by adopting "smarter" audit policies .that take into account the relationship between a firm's reported profits and reports for the industry as a whole. Such an audit policy will create an externality for the decision makers in the industry and this externality can be expected to affect not only firms' reporting policies but also their market decisions. If public policy takes into account wider economic issues than just revenue raising what is the appropriate way for a tax authority to run such an audit policy? We develop some clear policy rules in a standard model of an industry and show the effect of these rules using simulations.
Distributional Analysis Research Programme
The 
Introduction
Should a tax authority take into account the "real-economy" e¤ects of its compliance policy? The actions of tax authorities are often perceived in purely …nancial terms, perhaps as a kind of tax farmer that seeks to maximise the revenue for the government or as a …scal police o¢ cer that seeks to ensure enforcement of the law as e¤ectively as possible. However, just as a conventional police force may properly have objectives other than simple law enforcement (fostering good community relations for example) so the tax authority may be required to have concern for a broader range of economic objectives than simple revenue-raising and compliance. Although it is convenient as a modelling device to assume that an agency has a single …nan-cial target it would be unreasonable to insist that the government's di¤erent policy objectives were located in separate watertight compartments. In this paper we suppose that a sensible tax authority is concerned about issues of productive e¢ ciency in the economy and about equitable treatment of taxpayers. We develop a model of tax compliance by …rms and show how their activity in product markets is connected with the design and implementation of enforcement policy by a tax agency. Some aspects of the real-economy issues associated with tax compliance are already well known. For example in the case of the personal income tax and decisions made in the labour market the conventional Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model can be extended to incorporate labour supply. The conventional welfare-economic analysis of deadweight loss as applied to income taxes and commodity taxes can be extended to take tax noncompliance into account (Cowell 1990) . However the further considerations that apply in the case of the taxation of …rms have not been worked out. The case of …rms is special in terms of both the e¢ ciency and equity objectives .
First, the e¢ ciency considerations arise from the interaction among …rms within an industry as well as interaction of …rms with the tax authority. Bayer and Cowell (2009) have demonstrated that the e¤ectiveness of compliance policy depends on whether there is e¤ective competition or collusion among the …rms in the industry. 1 The interrelation between market organisation and the design of compliance policy raises several policy questions. Should audit rules be designed in such a way that …rms will be induced to act more e¢ ciently in product markets? Should a change in industry competitiveness change the design of compliance policy?
Second, the equity considerations arise precisely from the tailored audit rules that the tax-authority might employ to induce the behaviour in product markets that might be desirable on e¢ ciency grounds. A "smart"compliance policy may give the appearance of treating equals unequally in a way that does not arise in compliance models involving the personal income tax. This implies that in evaluating the desirability of compliance policy one needs to go beyond the conventional individualistic welfare model in order to deal with questions of tax equity.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains our approach and relates it to the literature and Section 3 sets out the formal model. Section 4 develops the simple welfare-analytics of this model examines its workings using a simulation; Section 5 discusses the special issues of equitable treatment that occur in the audit model with …rms; Section 6 draws the policy implications from this. Section 7 concludes.
2 The approach
Setting
Before we specify the precise model that we shall use to establish results and to simulate behaviour let us describe the economic agents and their interrelationships.
Firms In some treatments of the economics of tax compliance …rms are treated as no more than pro…t centres which can be tapped by the tax agency. More sophisticated approaches take some account of the …rms'role as producers but in a naive fashion that does not yield much economic insight. The standard assumption is either that each …rm is a price-taker without market power or that there is a perfectly-informed monopolist with almost complete market power. However, under conventional treatment of risk and taxation, each of these idealised market forms turns out to produce an analysis of tax evasion in which the …rms' characteristics are e¤ectively absent: 2 because each …rm is assumed to be in a particularly simple market environment, particularly simple results emerge.
To make the analysis interesting we need to think of the …rm also as an information processor. This involves analysing the behaviour of the …rm under uncertainty. The uncertainty comes from three sources:
1. exogenous uncertainty, such as demand shocks, cost shocks and assessment errors 2. uncertainty as to whether the …rm will be audited for tax purposes, 3. uncertainty about the behaviour of other …rms in a similar position to itself.
All three types of uncertainty will be seen to have a role within our model. The third type makes it clear that it is important to consider the …rm within the context of an industry where the behaviour of other …rms is important in determining its own behaviour.
Industry What is an industry? Our model of an industry focuses not so much on the physical characteristics of the outputs of the member …rms but on the relationship among them. In the light of the exogenous uncertainty mentioned as point 1 in the list above it makes sense to suppose that members of the industry are better-informed than other economic agents about market events that may a¤ect their pro…ts: they intimately know the economic conditions that apply to their industry and could, if they wanted to, make reasonable estimates of the performance of other industry members. In a sense the industry is an information network in which the insiders have an advantage over an outside observer such as the tax authority. If there were no information advantage then the tax authority could work out the pro…t-maximising decisions and the associated industry equilibrium for itself and audits would become virtually irrelevant. To keep the problem manageable we assume that the industry is assumed to have a …xed number of …rms: we do not attempt to account for entry into or exit from the industry. In our formal model it is su¢ cient to let the number of …rms be 2, although this simpli…cation is not essential to the main point of the argument. (Cowell 2004 , Lee 1998 .
Tax authority We suppose that tax policy is entrusted to an agency that has the responsibility for enforcement, control over audit policy, and, possibly, over tax design but not over the structure or level of penalties for illegal non-compliance (evasion). Its objectives may be wider than simple revenue raising: this is important in our discussion of e¢ ciency and policy design in Section 4. The tax authority will expect to …nd that di¤erent types of audit policy will have di¤erent types of impact on the …rms'behaviour. Once again the role of information is crucial because, although the tax authority will not have as good information about an industry as the insiders it will …nd that there is some information that can be used to re…ne and improve the audit policy.
Policy evaluation We assume that the tax authority is answerable to a government that cares about the well-being of its citizens. Accordingly policy can be evaluated in terms of welfare-economic criteria that are applied as standard to other problems of public policy evaluation such as cost-bene…t analysis.
Model
We begin with the factors that determine the …rms' taxable capacity. We represent the industry as a duopoly. The essential insights can easily be extended to an arbitrary number of heterogeneous …rms: the two-…rm model just requires some interpretation: if we focus on the behaviour of …rm 1 then "…rm 2"can be considered as a proxy for the rest of the industry in the eyes of …rm 1's decision makers.
Firms and industry
We assume that …rms make decisions about quantities of a good to produce and sell in a market. Each …rm's market opportunities are given by a linear inverse demand schedule:
where p is the the market price of the industry's output given that …rm 1 and …rm 2 supply quantities q 1 and q 2 to the market. If K 1 ( ) and K 2 ( ) are the production-cost functions of …rms 1 and 2 respectively, then pre-tax pro…ts are
In the standard industrial-organisation model this is almost the end of the story. There remains a type of endogenous uncertainty for each …rm about the output decisions of the other; this is usually resolved within a standard game-theoretic framework to capture the type of relationship between the economic agents in the industry; here we take each of two apparently standard cases:
Cournot: each …rm takes the other's output as …xed while solving its own pro…t-maximisation problem.
Collusion: the …rms act jointly in their decision making.
However, this is not almost the end of the story and, in the present context, these two cases are not quite the standard ones of the industrialorganisation literature. As we will discuss in Section 3.2, the introduction of taxation and the possibility of non-compliance introduce new elements to the pro…t-maximisation problem.
Tax regimes and (non-)compliance
Assume that the …rms' pro…ts 1 , 2 are the basis for taxation. The tax authority is aware that …rms may perceive that their information about the pro…ts that they make in a given year is better than the tax authority's information and that this may give them to under-report or to conceal. If the tax is proportional at rate t and there is full compliance by the …rm then the …rms'pro…ts. net of taxes are simply
However, these pro…ts are not directly observable by the tax authority without incurring the cost. Instead it receives declarations d 1 ; d 2 from each of the two …rms and it may choose to undertake a costly audit in order to check the truthfulness of the report. If a …rm is found to have under-reported, it is required to make up the shortfall of the tax and also to pay a …ne F . The size of the …ne is assumed to be outside the jurisdiction of the tax authority -we will assume it to be a …xed proportion of the under-reported pro…t, i d i for …rm i. Even with the presence of the …ne, less than complete compliance may still be an attractive option for a …rm, as discussed in section 3.3. How the …rm may be expected to react will depend on the type of audit policy in place and the consequent probability of being subjected to a …ne. We assume that the …rms are well informed about the audit strategy being used by the tax authority although not about how it will be applied in their own case. In other words all in the industry know how the probability of auditing individual …rms is determined but no …rm knows for sure that it will be audited. Clearly there is a wide range of possibilities for the structure of audits in the light of …rms' behaviour. However, we will focus on just two types of audit policy that are, perhaps, useful caricatures of actual practice and that enable us to analyse the role of information.
Fixed audit rule The simplest type of audit rule is one where it is common knowledge that there is a given probability 0 i that …rm i will be audited during the year: the probability does not depend on the reports d 1 ; d 2 . We will use this primitive type of policy as a benchmark.
The relative rule If the tax authority wants to make use of the imperfect information it has about the industry it could use this to tailor the audit rule for each individual …rm in the light of that …rm's declaration relative to declarations generally in the industry. The reports from each …rm are free information and we can imagine the situation where an intelligent tax authority would use this to ‡ag suspicious behaviour. If there were many similar …rms in the industry the tax authority might well concentrate its investigations on individual …rms reporting substantially below the industry average. In our two-…rm case this translates into a rule where, ceteris paribus, one always assigns a higher audit probability to the …rm reporting the lower pro…t. In the case where …rms 1 and 2 are indeed similar it is instructive to look at the linear relative audit rule that generates detection probabilities where a and b are policy parameters. Parameter a re ‡ects the total audit e¤ort by the authority and is determined by its budget: it is the average detection probability for any pattern of declarations by the two …rms. Parameter b captures the authority's reactivity: the higher is b the higher is the probability penalty for declaring low pro…ts. To ensure that i is not negative and is not greater than 1 we require b a= max , where max is the Cournot pro…t. Clearly the special case of the …xed audit rule where 
The …rm and its behaviour
We assume that …rms are concerned just about expected net pro…ts. If the …rms declare d 1 1 and d 2 2 but are not audited, then their after-tax pro…ts are, respectively, where f is the proportionate …ne rate, which is assumed to exceed t; such that the payment after a successful audit at least covers the evaded taxes.
There is one other element to the problem for which we have not yet allowed. E¤ective under-reporting, that is, …rms'activities leave trails in the product market and elsewhere. Simply reporting pro…ts that are manifestly inconsistent with these evidence trails is not credible so that some sort of explicit concealment activity needs to be involved. This activity is costly and we may reasonably suppose the marginal concealment cost to be increasing in the amount being concealed. Accordingly we let the cost of concealment be represented as
7 for i = 1; 2. Drawing together expressions (6) to (12) this means that the expected payo¤s for the two …rms, net of concealment costs, are
3.4 Workings of the model As we noted above, there is rather more to this analysis than a conventional quantity-setting oligopoly. Each …rm has two control variables q 1 and d 1 for …rm 1, q 2 and d 2 for …rm 2. Each …rm is directly a¤ected by the choices made by the other. The …rm's activities are carried out in two stages:
production stage: This covers the generation of taxable pro…t and includes production and sales of the product. In the model …rms choose q 1 ; q 2 .
declaration stage: This concerns the …nancial decisions made by the …rms: they choose
Although we reasonably imagine the declaration stage as being after the production stage, of course the decisions and expected outcomes in the second stage will feed back into decisions made in the …rst stage. Therefore we can expect that policy instruments that focus on the second-stage …nancial decisions may have repercussions also on the "real economy" decisions in the …rst stage. Furthermore, between the production stage and the declaration stage each …rm may experience a pro…t shock, which is observable to the …rms in the industry but unobservable to the tax authority. Because the quantities q 1 ; q 2 have already been chosen at the point when the shock occurs, pro…t shocks that result from …xed-cost shocks, marginal-cost shocks, demand shocks or observation errors by the tax authority can all be expressed in the same way. We assume that the …rms are essentially identical except for the pro…t shock; in particular they are perceived ex ante as identical by the tax authority when determining its audit rule.
The two stages and the two contrasting market assumptions, Cournot competition or collusion, lead us to consider four possible cases, which we will brie ‡y consider in turn.
Case 1: Cournot competition at both …rst and second stages.
Here the tax authority has a nice opportunity. Consider the standard model of a symmetric duopoly illustrated in Figure 1 where the two straight lines represent the reaction functions of the two …rms. If …rms were perfectly compliant on principle, or if the tax authority could perfectly observe market events so that there were no possibility of evasion, then equilibrium would be at point q
(we have q C 1 = q C 2 by symmetry). If the tax authority cannot observe events perfectly and just uses a …xed audit rule then this does not a¤ect the product market so that the reaction functions and equilibrium remain unaltered (Marrelli and Martina 1988 ). In our model this is the case when b, the reactivity of the rule in (6, 7), is zero. Then …rms face a declaration-independent detection probability of a: However, if the authority switches to a relative rule it creates an informational externality: each …rm knows that its probability of audit is going to depend on its declaration relative to the average declaration in the industry. Two things then happen. First, the switch to the relative rule causes each …rm to increase the declaration for any given level of output, for reasons that are straightforward to see intuitively. The reactivity of the relative rule is of special importance here.
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium the rule's reactivity b decreases the amount of taxes evaded:
Proof. See appendix. Second, there is an e¤ect on the …rst-stage reaction curves in Figure 1 . To see this note that an increase in …rm one's quantity q 1 in generally cause the pro…ts of …rm 2 to fall, which in turn reduces the optimal declaration of …rm 2. Therefore, …rm one can indirectly decrease its audit probability by increasing its production quantity. A …rm wants to do this up to the point where the own gross pro…t reduction of a further increase in q 1 outweighs the improved scope for evasion. By this reasoning we can see that the switch in the audit regime will move …rm 1's reaction function out to the right as shown. Of course the same e¤ect works for …rm 2 and so it is clear that equilibrium output must increase. Proof. See appendix.
Case 2: Cournot competition at the …rst stage, collusion at the second stage.
If …rms are able to cooperate on tax returns then it is clear that they will aim at eliminating the externality introduced by a relative audit rule. By coordinating their declarations they can avoid the dilemma that both …rms have an incentive to increase their declarations in order to reduce the audit probability. Consequently, in the case of collusion at the declaration stage, a relative rule loses its positive e¤ect on declared pro…ts and declarations become the same as under a …xed rule (i.e. the reactivity of the rule b is zero).
Proposition 3 If …rms collude on the declaration stage than in a symmetric equilibrium the reactivity of the rule b has no impact on the evaded tax.
Proof. See appendix Obviously, this raises the question how collusion at the declaration stage impacts on production decisions. The impact is not obvious. One might expect that eliminating the externality of the relative rule on the second stage also takes away any incentive to produce more than the Cournot quantity. Or even worse, one could conjecture that the collusion at the second stage might spill over to the production stage leading to quantities even smaller than those under Cournot competition. Luckily, these fears are unsubstantiated. Cooperation among …rms when they …le their tax returns does not fully eliminate the externality on production quantities created by a relative rule. The intuition is subtle. When …rms individually decide on their production quantities they foresee already that they will collude on the declaration stage later on. The jointly optimal declarations will depend on the gross pro…ts. As in the case without collusion …rm i's optimal declaration (now the one that maximises joint ex-post expected pro…t) increases with …rm j 0 s gross pro…t. For this reason -with the ultimate outcome in mind -a …rm wants to reduce the pro…t of the competitor by increasing production even when it knows that they will cooperate when …ling the tax returns.
Proposition 4 If …rms collude on the declaration stage then a relative rule (b > 0) still leads to quantities greater than the Cournot quantity.
Proof. See appendix. A relative rule loses its bene…cial e¤ect on evasion behaviour in the presence of collusive tax declarations but still delivers welfare gains in the product market through production quantities beyond the Cournot outcome.
Case 3: Collusion at the …rst stage, competition at the second stage.
Suppose the …rms can agree on total output and some allocation of output and pro…t between them. Since …rms are identical ex ante, assume further that they can only agree on quotas that lead to the same gross pro…t for both.
5 Once the gross pro…ts are realised the …rms independently declare pro…ts. Here the relative audit rule is obviously still e¤ective in reducing the amount of taxes evaded compared to a …xed rule, as the externality stemming from the relative rule is still on operation in the declaration stage.
Proposition 5 In a symmetric equilibrium with collusion at the declaration stage the rule's reactivity b decreases the amount of taxes evaded:
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. It remains to be determined, which production quantities the …rms will agree upon on the …rst stage. Intuition suggests that the relative rule operating on the second stage does not play a role. Since ex-post expected net pro…ts should increase with the gross pro…ts …rms should be able to agree on a joint monopoly production plan. The following Proposition con…rms this intuition.
Proposition 6 Duopolists that can enforce a cartel agreement with identical quotas produce half the monopoly quantity each.
Proof. See appendix.
Case 4: Collusion at both stages.
It is clear that this combination results e¤ectively in monopoly behaviour throughout; the distinction between the stages becomes arti…cial as does the distinction between the two types of audit rule. Under fairly weak conditions (e.g. symmetric cartel agreements) we know that output and declaration decisions become independent (Lee 1998) . 6 If …rms behave like one large pro…t maximising entity with respect to both production and declaration decisions then a relative rule loses all bite. It is worth noting that a relative rule at least does no harm in this highly collusive environment.
Audit policy
In the light of the diverse behaviour that will arise from auditor-…rm interaction under various competitive regimes there are some important policy implications to be investigated. We will do this in two stages in order to separate out pure e¢ ciency objectives from equity considerations: …rst we will examine the case where the pro…t shock is vanishingly small so that the …rms necessarily appear to the tax authority as identical if they make identical choices; then, in section 5 we will consider the impact of the pro…t shock.
In what follows we use a simulation to analyse how relative audit rules a¤ect revenue, quantities and evasion cost.
Case 1 Cournot competition at both stages
We …rst look at the non-collusion scenario, where we have established that a relative rule increases tax declarations for given pro…ts, but also reduces pro…ts by inducing higher production quantities, which in turn reduces declarations and revenue. So the total e¤ect of a relative audit rule on revenue has two con ‡icting components: a positive declaration e¤ect and a negative pro…t e¤ect. The declaration e¤ect is a …rst-order e¤ect, while the pro…t effect is only of second order. The declaration e¤ect is anticipated by …rms at the quantity-choice stage and production quantities are adapted accordingly. Thus, we can expect that a more ‡exible rule provides a "double dividend," which consists of an increased production quantity and an increased revenue. To investigate this we simulate the two-stage game using the model of equations (1)-(14) and the assumption that marginal production cost is a constant c.
First, if the authority uses a relative audit rule, what happens to output and tax revenue as the sensitivity of the rule and the tax rate change? Figure  2 shows contour plots of the simulated equilibrium quantity and revenue for c = 0:1, a = 0:25 and f = 0:5: 7 A lighter shading indicates higher values of the quantities and government revenue, respectively.
It is apparent that a more reactive rule increases production quantities and revenue for a given tax rate. The marginal quantity e¤ect of an increase in the sensitivity is decreasing. The marginal revenue e¤ect of the audit sensitivity increases with the tax rate. We see that a more reactive audit rule might lead to higher welfare, as a higher reactivity does not lead to an apparent con ‡ict between the revenue and industry output. The tax rate has an in ‡uence on the quantity only if the detection rule is relative. The For a partial-equilibrium welfare analysis we assume that the social welfare function places equal weight on consumer surplus CS, producer surplus and the revenue available for producing public goods. Then total surplus can be expressed as:
Figure 3 shows how the wasted resources (due to evasion activity) and the overall surplus depend on the tax rate and on the reactivity of the rule. Lighter shading again represents higher values. We see that a higher tax rate increases the waste, as it provides a higher evasion incentive. Since the evasion incentive is reduced by the reactivity of the rule, waste is reduced by an increase in b.
With respect to the surplus it is apparent that again a high reactivity is helpful. Overall welfare increases for a given tax rate with b. However, the impact of the tax rate is non-monotonic. On the one hand a relative rule works best at increasing output if the tax is high. The externality on production is the higher the more severe the consequences of evasion are, since the tax rate increases the stakes. On the other hand, a high tax rate increases evasion and therefore the evasion cost: the increased concealment investment represents a waste for the economy. We conclude that for every level of reactivity, there is a tax rate that maximises welfare. Note that the upper left corner of the graph (with the highest waste and low surplus but downward-sloping contours) is the region where …rms go underground and declare zero pro…t.
Cases 2 and 3: Partial collusion
We have seen so far that welfare increases with the reactivity of the rule if we assume that …rms do not collude. Figure 4 shows the total surplus for symmetric equilibria, when the …rms collude on the declaration or the production stage. 8 The chosen parameters are the same as above. It is apparent that increasing the reactivity of the relative rule is still welfare enhancing despite of the presence of collusion at one of the stages. In both Figure 4 : Surplus under collusion cases, collusion removes one bene…cial element of a relative rule. If …rms collude on the declaration stage then the externality that reduces evasion (and thus waste) is internalised, while the incentive to produce more than under a …xed rule is preserved, as increasing the quantity improves a …rm's position in the following collusive declaration stage. In the case of collusion at the production stage the relative rule has no impact on the quantities produced, as the …rms choose jointly gross-pro…t maximising quantities. The remaining bene…cial consequence of a relative rule is the reduction in evasion and wasted resources. 
Reactivity and inequity
We have seen that increasing the reactivity of the relative rule has a positive e¤ect on e¢ ciency. In this section we investigate if there are adverse distributive e¤ects related to a high reactivity. In what follows we will set up an environment where ex-ante identical …rms may end up with di¤erent gross pro…ts due to some external shocks, which cannot be observed by the authority. The pro…t shocks result in the ex-ante identical …rms becoming di¤erent observationally. The tax authority does not observe the shock and still believes that …rms are essentially identical. Consequently, the authority attributes any declaration di¤erences between …rms to di¤erences in the …rms evasion activities. Applying a relative rule then is intended to punish the …rm that tries to evade more. However, in the case when di¤erences in declaration actually result from good or bad luck (i.e. the realisation of the pro…t shock) then the relative rule punishes the …rm who had a bad draw, while it rewards the …rm that was lucky. The reactivity of the rule might be positively related to the degree of unfairness created by the relative rule.
To develop this argument, we …rst set up a simple version of shocks within our model and outline the resulting equilibrium (section 5.1). We then investigate how the reactivity of the rule in ‡uences allocations and examine whether the reactivity of the rule appears to produce an inequitable outcome (sections 5.2 and 5.3). We make the background assumption that the nominal tax system re ‡ects fairness an investigate the impact of the relative rule on di¤erent fairness criteria. Showing that our result holds for multiple measures provides a robustness check. The fairness criteria we use are linked to di¤erent distributional measures such as relative tax burden, relative pro…t after taxes, relative monetary expected net pro…t after audits and the relative total expected net pro…t including evasion cost. While we show that the reactivity of the rule has a negative impact on fairness, it is important to note that the positive e¤ect of an increased reactivity on welfare survives the modi…cation to our basic model. An e¢ ciency-equity trade-o¤ arises.
Shocks and unequal pro…ts
Denote the interim gross pro…t of the …rms by:
where ( 1 ; 2 ) are random pro…t shocks for the two …rms with known probability density function '. Because …rms are identical ex ante we require the shock distribution to be symmetrical so that
This restriction ensures that if say a represents a large negative shock, while b is small that then both …rms have the same probability of being the …rm that su¤ers the large shock.
For each possible combination of interim gross pro…ts of the two …rms there starts a declaration subgame: the subgame-perfect continuation is a pair of declarations for each possible pair of interim pro…ts. The rule for translating interim pro…ts into optimal declarations can be derived from the following maximisation problem.
In the case of the model in Section 3, solving for the optimal declarations depending on the interim pro…ts we have:
Through this decision rule a …rm can foresee its expected net pro…t for any interim pro…t pair. Denote the function that maps the interim pro…ts into an expected equilibrium pro…t by R i (~ i ;~ j ) which, in view of (15), is a function of q 1 ; q 2 , 1 and 2 : We now can compactly write down the …rst-stage maximisation problem of a …rm:
So, anticipating the declaration decision, a …rm will choose the quantity that maximises the expected net pro…t for a given quantity of the other …rm. The expectation is taken over the possible realisations of the …xed-cost shocks for both …rms. The explicit solution to this maximisation problem depends on the distribution of the shocks. It is important to note that the decision problem for both …rms is identical, since the …rms are identical ex ante (including the symmetry of the shocks). Consequently, if there exists at least one pure-strategy equilibrium then there is always a symmetrical equilibrium. Furthermore, if we have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium than this is the symmetric one. For simplicity we concentrate on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria. In such an equilibrium both …rms choose the same production quantity, i.e. q 1 = q 2 = q : As a consequence …rms' interim pro…ts only di¤er with respect to the realisations of the …xed-cost shocks:
In what follows we use the …ndings from above in order to judge if according to some criteria an increased reactivity has adverse e¤ects on equity considerations.
Reactivity and the relative tax burden
A natural criterion for fairness is the relative tax burden. Taking the linear pro…t-tax scheme as the basis for fairness intentions by the legislator then a …rm that has one dollar more pro…t than another should pay t dollar more in taxes. So suppose that a cost shock has led to the two …rms having interim pro…ts, which di¤er by : Note that we know from above that the gross pro…t excluding the shocks are the same for both …rms. Then we can use (16) in order to calculate the di¤erence in tax liabilities t d after the declaration:
For a …xed rule with b = 0 the di¤erence between the tax bills is just equal to the gross pro…t di¤erence multiplied by the tax rate. Therefore a …xed rule satis…es the criterion of fair relative tax burdens: a …rm with one dollar more in pro…ts pays t dollars more in taxes. The di¤erence in (17) declines when b increases. For a given situation and a given pro…t di¤erence an increase in the reactivity of the rule has a potentially unwanted distributional side-e¤ect.
The pro…t gap has a smaller impact on the di¤erences in tax payments than intended by the tax law. This favours the …rm that by chance ended up with a higher interim pro…t. It will be able to exploit the relative rule, as the authority directs more resources to the …rm with the lower pro…t, since that …rm looks more suspicious. Consequently, the …rm will pay less than the intended 100t cents more per dollar of extra pro…t. The gap between the intended relative tax burden and the e¤ective tax burden (before auditing takes place) widens with the reactivity of the rule; it is straightforward to extend this analysis to the di¤erence in net pro…ts before auditing. The di¤erence is
where (1 t) is intended by the legislator. The …rm with the higher gross pro…t will enjoy a larger net pro…t gap to the …rm with the lower pro…t than intended whenever the rule has positive reactivity.
This advantage enjoyed by the …rm with higher gross pro…t suggests that the tax treatment of the two …rms could be regarded as unfair. What is more, unlike the case with the taxation of personal incomes where individual taxpayers probably do not know the incomes and tax assessments of other individuals, in the case of …rms it is reasonable to assume that …rms know each others' circumstances, know their competitors' pro…ts and may know how other …rms are being treated for tax purposes; the tax authority, although not able to observe the circumstances and pro…ts of …rms accurately will be aware that this information is common knowledge within the industry and will thus be aware that their audit policy may generate a perception of unfairness. Based on the di¤erence in net pro…ts (before audits take place) we can de…ne an unfairness measure capturing the relative advantage of a …rm earning more than the other …rm. Our …rst measure 1 takes the net pro…t gap, normalises the underlying gross pro…t di¤erence to one dollar and subtracts the fair gap of 1 t:
Clearly 1 measures by how many dollars the resulting net pro…t gap exceeds the fair gap. More precisely 1 measures the gap between the two …rms'after tax pro…ts per dollar of gross pro…t di¤erence over and above the gap intended by tax law, which is 1 t. Unfairness according to this measure increases with the reactivity of the rule. A …xed rule (i.e. b = 0) does not result in any unfairness, as 1 becomes zero in that case. For a given positive reactivity distributional unfairness increases with the tax rate.
Reactivity and relative expected net payo¤ after auditing
We have seen that the …rm with a coincidentally higher gross pro…t can exploit the fact that the relative rule does not take this coincidence into account and therefore considers this …rm as less suspicious. Does this unfair advantage prevail if we take into account that the lucky …rm will have to pay higher …nes if caught. The intended di¤erence in expected net pro…t after auditing ~ t d EF; where EF denotes the expected …ne, can be calculated as
Taking the same approach from above and expressing the gap per monetary unit and normalising by subtracting the fair gap we get a measure for the unfair advantage of the more pro…table …rm for the expected post audit pro…t:
The di¤erence between 2 and 1 is that 2 takes into account two additional factors, the higher …ne the richer …rm has to pay if caught but also the reduced audit probability of the richer …rm stemming from a higher declaration than that of the less pro…table …rm. This wider de…nition of fairness leaves our qualitative result from above unchanged. As for our …rst measure a …xed rule (b = 0) does not lead to unfairness, since then the expected pro…t gap (including auditing and …nes) is exactly 1 t as intended by the legislator;
2 is equal to zero. The pro…t gap increases with b. 10 So also if expected net pro…t after an audit is the criterion an authority adheres to when it comes to fairness then the reactivity of the rule has a negative impact on distributional fairness. The higher b the larger is the deviation from the intended net pro…t di¤erence of 1 t per dollar. As with 1 the tax rate is positively related to distributional unfairness if the rule is relative.
Reactivity and fairness when evasion cost are considered
Typically, one would expect that authorities are not too concerned about …rms'costs that arise only from evasion activity. In the present case it might make sense though, since including the evasion cost provides a good robustness check of our qualitative results. A higher reactivity of the audit rule increases allocative e¢ ciency but might cause some distributional concerns, as we have discussed. The distributional inequity comes from the fact that a relative rule does not take into account unobserved pro…t di¤erences. Hence, a …rm with a coincidentally higher pro…t has an advantage, since the rule treats the higher declaration as a sign of the …rm evading less, whereas it is rather a sign of the …rm having a higher pro…t. The …rm can exploit this by evading more taxes. With evading more taxes the …rm will also have to incur higher real resource cost arising from the evasion activity. These costs are not included in either of the two measures we investigated previously. Here we ask if the reactivity of the rule still leads to distributional concerns if we take into account evasion costs. So we are interested in the di¤erence of total equilibrium net pro…ts of two …rms who accidentally ended up with di¤erent payo¤s EU . We construct the unfairness measure 3 that includes the evasion cost in the same way as above (normalising to one and subtracting the fair gap 1 t):
Measure 3 is closely related to 2 , as it only di¤ers by a factor of f (1 + bf )=(2 + bf ): Not surprisingly, also for this measure a …xed audit rule does not lead to any distributional distortions, since 3 = 0 for b = 0: However, even if one takes into account the evasion cost an increase in the reactivity leads to greater unfairness, since 3 increases in b
where t > af is the condition for evasion to take place. 11 As for the other measures for a given positive b an increase in the tax rate increases unfairness.
Policy
Some policy consequences are clear. In the absence of shocks a government that wants to maximise welfare should set the reactivity to its maximum level. This …nding does not depend on our speci…c example and it does not depend on what we assume about competition or collaboration.
By contrast the tax rate that maximises welfare for the maximum b does depend on the speci…c example and on the competitiveness of choices at each of the the two stages. Figure 5 plots the highest optimal tax rate depending on the reactivity of the audit rule and the particular assumption on collusion for the parameter values from above. We consider the tax rate as optimal if it maximises the surplus given the parameters and the form of competition. Observe that given our parameter values a tax rate below 0:125 leads to truthful pro…t declarations in all three scenarios. Tax rates between zero and 0:125 yield the same surplus in all scenarios. In Figure 5 we only consider the highest optimal tax rate, which is the one that yields the highest revenue among those that maximise surplus.
In all three scenarios under a …xed rule (b = 0) a tax rate of 0:125 (or below) is optimal, as a …xed rule has no e¤ect on allocative e¢ ciency in the goods market. Therefore, welfare is maximised, when the wasted resources for covering evasion is minimised. The optimal tax rate then should prevent evasion. Now turn to a relative rule. The only scenario where the relative rule has no positive in ‡uence on the welfare created in the goods market is when there is collusion at the production stage. Consequently, the optimal tax rate in the presence of cartels should again minimise the wasted resources from evasion. Independent of the reactivity of the rule a tax rate of or below 0:125 is optimal here, since then evasion does not occur.
In the case of collusion at the declaration stage there is a positive e¤ect of the relative rule on production quantities. This e¤ect is the stronger the more reactive the rule and the higher the tax rate. The trade-o¤ between the additional waste from increased evasion caused by a higher tax rate and the increased allocative e¢ ciency in the goods market yields an increasing relationship between the reactivity of the rule and the optimal tax rate.
If …rms collude neither on the declaration stage nor on the production stage then a more reactive rule does not only increase welfare in the goods market but also ceteris paribus decreases evasion and waste. It follows that the waste does not increase as rapidly with the tax rate as under collusion at the declaration stage. This implies that the optimal tax rate is higher and increases more strongly with the reactivity of the rule when competition rules on both stages.
To summarise our insights from the welfare simulations, we conclude that a relative audit rule has widespread advantages over a …xed rule. Furthermore, a more reactive rule is usually preferred, as it leads to welfare gains.
What are the implications for tax-enforcement policy of a change in competitiveness of the industry? As long as …rms do not collude in the goods market, a higher reactivity allows for higher tax rates without damaging welfare. So, increasing the reactivity has another desirable e¤ect for governments.
On the other hand it might be argued that conventional welfare analysis reveals a feature of the model that should be considered slightly unpleasant. Typically; if one assumes that …rms are essentially identical, it is optimal to spend all the audit resources on the …rm that reports the lowest pro…t (b ! 1 ). It might be thought that this somewhat extreme position is like the old question about severity of punishment versus probability of detection as a deterrent to a rational tax evader (because increasing the …ne appears to have no resource cost whereas increasing the detection probability does, it appears to be optimal to require the death penalty for the slightest amount of tax evasion - Kolm 1973 , Cowell 1989 . However, the analogy is not appropriate. If there are errors in information or in administration then the "Death to Tax Evaders" policy produces awful outcomes for those who are innocent; but in our model such errors may just mean that the tax authority is focusing resources on small fry and letting some big corporate evaders o¤ the hook. But the innocent are not su¤ering and no agent is faced with a threat of in…nite penalty. These points illustrate the limitations of the conventional individualistic welfare approach in the present case. Because we are not dealing with distributional outcomes for individual persons conventional welfare-based approaches to inequality are not applicable. Nevertheless it still makes sense to discuss fairness or equity issues in terms of di¤erences in outcome (net pro…ts) and di¤erences in treatment arising from the audit rule. What underlies this is the …rst form of uncertainty described in section 2; what can make it seem unfair are the second and third forms of uncertainty: external shocks make like entities appear unalike and may provide the basis for a relatively favoured …rm to exploit the relative audit rule to its own advantage. Concern for this unfairness of treatment will impose a limit on the optimal choice of b.
Conclusions
This paper has shown that the design of a tax authority's audit policy can have important e¤ects on production decisions by …rms. The nature of those e¤ects depends on whether …rms compete or collude. Accordingly an appropriately designed audit policy may not only achieve greater compliance and higher net revenue for given output and resources spent on audit but may also have other e¤ects that would be normally be considered desirable in a wider economic context. By a smart design of the audit policy the authorities can create an informational externality that partially o¤sets the informational advantages of industry insiders. Since decisions in the product market are taken in the light of the eventual outcome of net after-tax expected pro…ts the audit policy can create a linkage to output decisions: speci…cally it may be possible to nudge …rms in the direction of greater e¢ ciency.
As …rms are ex ante identical we can use symmetry (i.e. j = i ) on the quantity stage. The equilibrium declaration becomes.
which implies that an interior solution requires t > af . The amount of tax evaded is
Taking the derivative with respect to b gives the desired negative e¤ect of b on the taxes evaded.
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Take the …rst order condition for the optimal quantity at the gross pro…t maximum of …rm i (i.e. @ i =@q i = 0):
From (18) we know that 0 < @d i @ j = bf 2 + 3bf < @d j @ j = 2(1 + bf ) 2 + 3bf ; which together with @ j =@q i < 0 implies that
Consequently, under b = 0 the duopolists set @ i =@q i = 0, which yields the Cournot solution. Under a relative rule a duopolist's optimal quantity given the quantity produced by the opponent is greater than Cournot bestresponse to the opponent's quantity, i.e. @ i =@q i < 0. Exploiting symmetry we know that the equilibrium quantity lies on the 45-degree in the q i ; q j space. Since the best-response quantity is greater than the Cournot best response quantity for any quantity of the opponent, the best-response function crosses the 45-degree line on a point above and to the right of the Cournot solution.
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A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. Joint pro…t maximisation on the declaration stage leads to declarations such that Taking …rst-order conditions with respect to d 1 and d 2 and solving gives
(1 + 2bf ) (af t) + (2 + 3bf ) i + bf j 2 + 4bf 8i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6 = j
Invoking symmetry on the production stage (i.e. i = j ) the optimal declaration under collusion at the declaration stage becomes
The evaded tax per …rm is
which does not depend on b:
A.4 Proposition 4
Proof. Take the …rst-order condition for …rm i 0 s quantity and evaluate it at it's Cournot best-response
which is the same as (20). However, the reaction of the optimal declarations to changes in the gross pro…ts are di¤erent in the case of collusion. They can be taken from the jointly optimal declarations in (21):
0 < @d i @ j = bf 2 + 4bf < @d j @ j = 2 + 3bf 2 + 4bf :
By the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2 we have Proof. First observe that gross pro…ts will be identical when we restrict the …rms to the use of only symmetric cartel agreements. Anticipating this the two …rms will know that they both will declare the same pro…t, which means that they will end up audit probability a: We can write the joint pro…t as
where (Q) is one …rm's pro…t for total output Q = 2q. Taking the …rst-order condition and dividing by two gives which implies that the joint monopoly quantity is chosen (i.e. where @ =@Q = 0):
